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Nevertheless, despite improved legal support in Korea, whistleblowing still appears to be detrimental to public officials' careers, with dismissal often following the decision to come forward (Chang et al., 2013) .
Although public officials are cognizant of the difficulties of reporting wrongdoing, and many shoulder the risks and potential hardships, why do some public officials intend to blow the whistle while others do not? What factors influence their whistleblowing decisions?
The present study examines these two questions in the Korean context. Using large-scale survey data, we analyze the extent to which there is a conducive environment in Korea by examining public officials' attitudes toward and knowledge of whistleblowing along with perceptions of organizational support and protection against retaliation, and testing their relationship to whistleblowing intention.
It is important to note that we examine intent, rather than actual whistleblowing behavior. Intent has been viewed as a predictor of behavior generally (Ajzen, 1991) , and whistleblowing in particular (Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009) . While recognizing that the actual results for whistleblowing may differ from intent (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005) , we follow a number of previous studies in using intent as a proxy for behavior (Keil, Tiwana, Sainsbury & Sneha, 2010; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009 ), due to the reported relationship with behavior and the challenges of obtaining large-scale data on infrequent behavior.
While there have been numerous attempts at explaining whistleblowing intention (Ahmad, Ismail & Azmi, 2013; Cho & Song, 2015 Keil et al., 2010 Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009; Robinson, Robertson & Curtis, 2012) , the complexity of the issue and range of potential variables means that there are difficulties when attempting to apply over-arching theories to whistleblowing. As such, the present study draws upon a range of literature in order to formulate and test hypotheses relating to attitude toward and knowledge of whistleblowing, along with colleague and organizational support, and perceived protection against retaliation.
This study aims to contribute to the literature in three main ways. The first is to contribute to the international and cross-cultural research on whistleblowing by furthering knowledge about whistleblowing in the Korean context. Although there is a growing international literature on whistleblowing (Hwang, Staley, Te Chen & Lan, 2008; Keenan, 2007; Zhang, Chiu & Wei, 2009) , it is still the case that less is known about the whistleblowing intention of government employees outside of the West. The Korean central government is a suitable case for investigation due to the introduction of policies and sustained efforts at implementation. Indeed, there have been ongoing attempts to change attitudes toward whistleblowing, along with improving related knowledge and organizational support and protection for whistleblowers (ACRC, 2016 ). Yet, the Korean government continues to face difficulties in its fight against corruption (Transparency International, 2016) . Thus, there is a need to examine the whistleblowing intention of public sector employees within this context. The second aim is to contribute to theory development on whistleblowing through testing a number of hypotheses. Finally, this study seeks to make recommendations for government organizations that will help to create a more conducive environment for reporting wrongdoing.
The remainder of this study is composed as follows. Whistleblowing in the Korean context is discussed in the next part, along with hypotheses based upon the literature about predictors of whistleblowing intention. After outlining the study methods, the results of the statistical analysis of survey data collected from 5706 central government public officials are presented. In the final part, conclusions are drawn and suggestions outlined for improving whistleblower protection.
Theoretical Background

Whistleblowing and the Korean Context
Whistleblowing has been famously defined as "disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, and illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action" (Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 4) .
Though originally developed in relation to the private sector, this definition has been widely applied in public sector research (Robinson et al., 2012; Tavakoli, Keenan & CranjakKaranovic, 2003) . According to this perspective, whistleblowing is a process that involves "the whistleblower, the whistleblowing act or complaint, the party to whom the complaint is made, and the organization against which the complaint is lodged" (Near & Miceli, 1985, p. 2).
In the Korean context, it is important to note the distinctive political environment, where factors relating to government, economics, labor market, and culture may have constrained whistleblowing. There have been successive waves of administrative and regulatory reforms since democratization in the late 1980s. However, the limits of liberalization in the face of strong state traditions have been emphasized, and there has not been a dramatic reduction in the influence of elected politicians over the bureaucracy since democratization (Park & Wilding, 2016) .
Close working relationships between politicians and the chaebol (diversified conglomerates) continue and have included presidential pardons of senior chaebol figures convicted of corruption related crimes (The Economist, 2010) . Most recently, former president Park Geun-hye was arrested in March 2017 following impeachment for using her business connections to pressure companies to give millions of dollars to the non-profit foundations of her confidante Choi Soon-sil (BBC News, 2016) . It remains to be seen whether this will affect attitudes to corruption in the longer term. However, the benefits that the chaebol bring to Korean society in terms of employment and financial investment mean that individuals may hesitate to challenge their interests.
While public sector jobs have long been coveted in Korea due the status and jobsecurity offered, a key development since the 1997 Asian financial crisis has been labor market deregulation. Approximately one third of Korean jobs now have 'non-standard' employment conditions meaning that there is no security of tenure, and less wages and benefits than for standard employees (Cooke & Brown, 2015) . Thus, public sector jobs continue to be desirable, as seen through the competitive examination system. This raises questions about the extent to which public employees would risk their employment to report corruption.
In terms of cultural context, Korea differs from the West due to its traditional emphasis on Confucianism and hierarchical collectivism (Wilding, Chae & Jang, 2014; Yang & Torneo, 2016) . Confucianism stresses love, harmony, kindness, and benevolence, underpinned by respect for seniors (according to age and position) (Kee, 2008) . In terms of hierarchical collectivism, Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) point to group loyalties and uncertainty avoidance among the Korean people as key characteristics. Both Confucianism and hierarchical collectivism may be important for whistleblowing as it has been argued that in contemporary Korea, the traditional loyalty between sovereign and subject has been reinterpreted as organizational loyalty (Park, Rehg & Lee, 2005) , and that there has been a tendency to view whistleblowers as betrayers (Chang, Park & Min, 2011) .
Although it was not until 2001 that the Anti-Corruption Act was passed, a number of early public sector whistleblowing cases greatly contributed to controlling corruption, promoting budgetary efficiency, guaranteeing people's right to know, and advancing human rights (Park, 2008) . Still, despite benefiting Korean society, the absence of appropriate legal protections meant that whistleblowers were harshly treated in the form of job loss and even suicide resulting from social pressure and retaliation (Shin, 2006) . The first instance of public whistleblowing since 1953 took place in 1990 when Lee Moon-ok, a public official of the Board of Audit and Inspection, spoke out about the role of illegal lobbies in the halting of investigations into chaebol branches. His whistleblowing exposed the undesirable and illegal cooperation between government and the chaebol. Nevertheless, Lee was placed under arrest for four days after he stepped forward, on the grounds that he had disclosed confidential information relating to his duty, and he also lost his job. In 1996, Lee won all resulting lawsuits, and was found not guilty of disclosing confidential information. After his five-year legal battle, he came back to government employment in a different role, before retiring in 1999 (Huh, 2010 According to J.Y. , there were 32 significant whistleblowing cases during the 1990s in diverse organizations and across a number of fields, including cases involving the Audit Board, the military, the police, local elections, social welfare facilities, the Bank of Korea, private schools, Incheon Airport, and various government contracts. The lack of sufficient legal protection meant that most whistleblowers lost their jobs. Interestingly, a 1999 study into perceptions and attitude toward whistleblowing among 389 public officials working for Seoul City government found that over half of respondents would whistleblow if they uncovered corruption and the problem persisted after their efforts to fix it (Lee, 1999 (Park, 2004; Lee, J.Y., 2003) .
The Act incorporated whistleblowing provisions including a requirement for public officials to report cases of corruption, and set forth guidelines for whistleblowing and investigation processes, protection from retaliation, compensation and reward, and establishment of the Anti-Corruption Agency (Committee), which was "the first legal agency that was solely dedicated to anticorruption function in Korean history" (Choi, 2009, p. 200 corruption, the ACRC recovered a total of US$60.3 million, while whistleblowers received US$6.2 million in financial compensation (Wolfe et al., 2014) . The rewards ranged from 4% to 20% of the recovered government revenues, with the upper limit increasing to 30% in October 2015 to reinforce the incentives for reporting wrongdoing (ACRC, 2016) . During 2002-2013, there were 181 requests for whistleblower protection and 36% of these were granted (Wolfe et al., 2014) .
Even though the government has attempted to shape a better legal environment for whistleblowers, and the law seems somewhat effective at protecting whistleblowers and exposing corruption, Korea still needs to address shortcomings in the law. According to a recent assessment of worldwide whistleblowing protection provisions, the Korean public sector whistleblower protection law presents unclear rules in three areas: circumstances where seeking external reporting channels are justified, internal disclosure procedures, and protections for anonymous reporting (Wolfe et al., 2014) . In the Corruption Perceptions 
Predictors of Public Sector Whistleblowing Intention in Korea
As discussed above, changes to the legal environment since the enactment of the AntiCorruption Act in 2001 have established whistleblowing processes along with a system of rewards/ compensation and mechanisms for whistleblower protection in the Korean public sector. The breadth of these changes suggests that there is a need to examine the extent to which attitude toward whistleblowing, knowledge of whistleblowing processes, perceived protection against retaliation, organizational support, and colleague support impact upon whistleblowing intention. The Act has been in operation for some time, and there has been increased publicity about protection for whistleblowers. We therefore expect that public officials will have knowledge of and a favorable attitude toward whistleblowing, along with a positive perception of support and protection available from their organization and colleagues.
Attitude toward whistleblowing. Attitude toward a behavior means "the degree to which a person has a favorable or unfavorable evaluation or appraisal of the behavior in question" (Ajzen, 1991, p. 188) . It is important to measure attitude toward whistleblowing as an independent variable, as a supportive attitude is not the same as whistleblowing intention and there is not always a strong link between the two, particularly if there are few resources and opportunities available and there are perceived negative social pressures (Ajzen, 1991) .
Still, generally, as a person's attitude toward a behavior becomes more favorable, intention to perform the behavior becomes stronger. As such, a number of studies have analyzed attitude as a predictor of whistleblowing intention (Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009; Park et al., 2005; Richardson, Wang & Hall, 2012; Trongmateerut & Sweeney, 2012) . More specifically, attitude has been found to have a positive effect on internal whistleblowing intention in Korea (Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009 ). We, therefore, hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Positive attitude toward whistleblowing increases whistleblowing intention among public officials.
Knowledge of whistleblowing process. As noted above, the Anti-Corruption Act outlines the overall public sector whistleblowing process, including who can and who should blow the whistle, where they can report, and how to proceed. The law supports internal whistleblowing only; public officials should only report to the ACRC, investigative agencies, or the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea. If external reports are made (i.e., to the press or non-profit organizations), the whistleblower will not receive legal protection. Under the law, all informers should identify themselves to the agency where they file the report by submitting their personal information, including name and affiliation. Importantly, the law also outlines protection which is available against retaliation and how to obtain financial compensation.
Knowledge of whistleblowing channels and processes might be an important predictor of whistleblowing intention. Even though the government has enacted a range of whistleblower protections, if people lack knowledge about appropriate channels and the whistleblowing procedure, they will be hesitant to come forward (Near & Miceli, 1985) .
Similarly, Cho and Song (2015) found whistleblowing training to have a positive effect on whistleblowing intention. Therefore, the current study hypothesizes that:
Hypothesis 2: Greater knowledge about appropriate channels and procedures of whistleblowing increases whistleblowing intention among public officials.
Colleague and organizational support for whistleblowing. Members of an organization can perceive organizational support by fair and transparent operation of dissent channels, whistleblowing education programs, and leaders, middle managers, or colleagues' positive responses after previous whistleblowing incidents (Miceli, Near, Rehg & Van Scotter, 2012; Miceli, 1995; Sims & Keenan, 1998; Thoroughgood, Hunter & Sawyer, 2011 
Control Variables
While attitude toward and knowledge of whistleblowing are important, along with organizational support and protection, there is also a need to address personal variables, as some demographic groups may be more likely to blow the whistle than others. Researchers have found various demographic predictors to influence whistleblowing intention. More specifically, gender, age, income, education, and marital status have been shown to have a significant influence (Keil et al., 2010; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Miceli & Near, 1988 , Sims & Keenan, 1998 Zhang et al., 2009 ). However, the results have often varied considerably. For example, on the one hand, studies by Keil et al. (2010) and MesmerMagnus and Viswesvaran (2005) suggest that women are more likely to blow the whistle than men. On the other hand, Miceli and Near (1988) , Sims and Keenan (1999) , and Bashir et al. (2011) claim that men are more likely to decide to blow the whistle than women. In a similar vein, age is a significant variable for Bashir et al. (2011) , Keil et al. (2010) , and Zhang et al.
(2009), but Sims and Keenan (1999) find age to have little influence on whistleblowing decision. The present study includes gender, marital status, tenure, duty and position. We anticipate that gender may be of particular relevance. Even when occupying nominally the same roles, women are often treated differently than men (Franke, Crown & Spake, 1997) , and may face harsher retaliation for whistleblowing (Rehg, Miceli, Near & Van Scotter, 2008) . Given Korean women's disadvantage in the labor market (Cooke & Brown, 2015) , they may be less willing to put their career at risk in order to report wrongdoing.
Method Data
The 
Measures
The dependent variable is whistleblowing intention (WBI), as outlined in the statement "I intend to blow the whistle if I find corruption in my organization."4 Respondents were asked to choose an option from four ordered responses (Strongly disagree; Disagree; Agree; Strongly agree). Using these ordinal responses means that we are not able to measure the distance between the responses (for example, the difference between strongly agree and agree). There is much debate about the benefits of a neutral response option (i.e., neither agree nor disagree), with some researchers recommending its inclusion in order to reduce response bias (Weijters, Cabooter & Schillewaert, 2010) . However, by eliminating the midpoint response, we attempted to stimulate respondents' cognitive processes to decide on optimal answers (Krosnick, Narayan & Smith, 1996) . A related issue is the number of response alternatives. While reliability and validity have been found to improve as the number of response alternatives increases, it has been suggested that the optimum number of options is between four and seven (Lozano, García-Cueto & Muñiz, 2008) .
The main explanatory variables were measured using single items as follows: attitude toward whistleblowing ("In general, I support public officials' whistleblowing"); knowledge of whistleblowing ("I know appropriate procedures and have sufficient knowledge about whistleblowing"); perceived protection against retaliation ("I think public officials are properly protected from possible retaliation when they become whistleblowers");
4 Based upon the Anti-Corruption Act, public officials should only report corruption which violates the law to the ACRC, investigative agencies, or the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea. Thus, responses were not concerned with other forms of wrongdoing (which violate social norms but not the law for example), nor reporting to supervisors, press, or the public.
organizational support ("My organization supports whistleblowing"); and colleague support ("My colleagues support whistleblowing"). While there are occasions where multiple item measures are desirable, the aim was to provide a concise web-based survey by shortening the number of questions and thus, boosting response rates, which are relatively low in online surveys (Christophersen & Konradt, 2011) . 
Sample
The Audit and Inspection Research Institute did not target public officials with specific characteristics, which means that the sample is more representative of some groups than others. As can be seen in Table 1 , there were more male (76.6%) than female respondents (23.4%). In the population of central government public officials, the respective percentages were 68.9% and 31.1% (MOPAS, 2012) . When it comes to length of service, there was a relatively even spread, with the most frequent responses being 16-20 years of service (20.7%), 21-25 years of service (18.8%), and 6-10 years of service (17.7%). The great majority of respondents (84.3%) were married, which reflects national trends (Frejka, Jones & Sardon, 2010) . A wide range of job duties were found among respondents, with the most frequent responses being general service (30.1%), followed by planning, budgeting, and research (15.4%). The survey was broadly representative in terms of position type, with the exception of special service employees, who at 12.0% were overrepresented (1.0% in the population), and skilled and technical service employees, who at 7.1% were underrepresented (24.9% in the population) (MOPAS, 2012).
Analytical Strategy
The analysis involved three steps. The first involved using factor association to explore the association of each factor with WBI in order to generate descriptive statistics to better understand the sample characteristics (the relationships between the predictors on the one hand and WBI on the other). In the second step, ordered probit models were fitted to predict public officials' WBI. Ordered probit analysis was used as the dependent variable takes the form of an ordered category, and it allows us to measure the WBI of respondents with particular characteristics (attitude, knowledge, colleague support, etc.).
The model is shown below: WBIi = β1*ATTITUDE+ β2*KNOWLEDGE+ β3*ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT + β4* COLLEAGUE SUPPORT + β5*PROTECTION + β6*FEMALE+ β7*MARRIED+ β8*TENURE+ β9* DUTY+ β10* POSITION+ εi where ε is normally distributed (Liao, 1994) .
The dependent ordered variable WBIi of an observation i takes the values of 1, 2, 3 and 4 in accordance with the k cut-off points (threshold parameters) as follows: In the third step, average marginal effects in the ordered probit model were investigated. This strategy allowed the examination of the discrete change in predicted probability of each level of WBI for each of the values of the predictors. In particular, outcomes of high levels of WBI were focused on (WBI=3 and WBI=4). For marginal effects estimation, average marginal effects (AMEs) were used. While marginal effects at the means (MEM) are widely used (Williams, 2012) , MEM has the limitation that it uses some values that a real person could not have, such as being 23.4% female or 84.3% married. In contrast, AME involves computing the marginal effects for every case in the sample, rather than simply using the means.
Results
Factor Association with Whistleblowing Intention
Factor association with WBI is summarized in This suggests that colleague and organizational support play an important role in influencing the level of WBI. A similar relationship was also observed for response 4; the highest degrees (i.e., 4 out of 4) of attitude, knowledge, colleague and organizational support, and protection against retaliation were associated with the greatest shares of the strongly positive WBI, ranging from 61.4% (knowledge=4) to 83.2% (protection against retaliation=4).
In terms of control variables, male respondents showed higher rates (by 2% for WBI=3 and 10.5% for WBI=4 respectively), indicating stronger WBI by male compared to female public employees. Being married seemed to have a negligible difference in the two highest WBI categories, as differences of less than 3% were observed. Factor association also tells us little about the remaining control variables. When it comes to tenure, for example, officials with 36 years or more experience were the most likely to select WBI=3, while those with 31-35 years' experience were least likely (a difference of 15.5%). However, for WBI=4, this situation was reversed; officials with 31-35 years' experience were 12% more likely to select the highest category of WBI when compared to colleagues with 36 years or more experience. In order to investigate the relationships in more depth, we conducted an ordered probit regression analysis. Table 2 ), while perceived level of protection and demographic variables hardly contributed to the variance.
Table 2 to Feature Here
In order to focus on the relationship with high levels of WBI, the next step was to examine the marginal effects. As displayed in Table 3 , attitude, knowledge, colleague support, organizational support, and protection against retaliation have strong positive effects on the choice of the highest category, WBI=4 (β=0.228, 0.276, 0.698, 0.504, 0.197, all p<0.01 ).
Females showed a lower propensity to choose the strongest WBI response than males.
Service of five years or more also had a negative effect on choosing WBI=4. However, tenure of 20 years or more was not statistically significant at 5%, suggesting that respondents with tenure length of over 20 years are similar to those with a short tenure of 1-5 years when it comes to choosing WBI=4. In contrast, positions generally had a positive relationship with WBI=4, although not all positions were statistically significant. Marital status and job duty
were not found to be good predictors (p>0.05).
While ordered probit estimates reveal the average effect of each predictor, average marginal effects show a discrete change in the expected probability of choosing response category 4 (WBI=4). The largest changes were for colleague support and organizational support; a one-point increase in colleague support and organizational support raises the probability of choosing WBI=4 by approximately 12.5% and 9% respectively. Other main factors had relatively less influence on choosing the highest category. Each additional level of attitude and knowledge is associated with 4.1% and 4.9% increased likelihood of choosing WBI=4. For each higher level of perceived protection, individuals were 3.3% less likely to select WBI=2 and 3.5% more likely to report WBI=4. Female public officials, however, are negatively associated with WBI=4; they were 3.4% less likely to report WBI=4 than men.
Those with 6-20 years of service were also 2-3% less inclined to choose WBI=4 than those whose tenure was 1-5 years. In terms of position, political appointees were 8.1% more likely to select the highest category of WBI, followed by skilled and technical services (4.1%) and special services (2.3%), when compared to the regular government service position. The analysis of marginal effects, while supporting the role of attitude and knowledge, sheds light on the importance of colleague and organizational support. Indeed, colleague and organizational support were the first and second strongest predictors of WBI=4 respectively.
WBI increased with higher reported levels of colleague and organizational support, which emphasizes the importance of government responsibility in encouraging and supporting whistleblowing. This responsibility goes beyond a rule based approach to the creation of a supportive atmosphere. Perceived protection against retaliation, with the least influence among the main variables, plays less of a role than in previous studies (Rothschild, 2008) . This is particularly interesting given the Korean context and history of severe consequences (Lee, J.M., 2003; Lee, J.Y., 2003) .
When taken together with the findings for organizational and colleague support, it may be that the benefits of formal protection are perceived to be limited if faced with potentially hostile responses from colleagues and the wider organization. Even when whistleblowers have not been dismissed, forced to resign, or blacklisted, they have faced difficulties such as being excluded from organizational opinion channels, having work withheld, and being isolated from their colleagues (Chang et al., 2013; Jeon, 2003) .
Consequently, most whistleblowers have felt isolated and faced emotional and physical health problems.
Turning to the control variables, female public officials reported lower WBI. There has been considerable debate in the literature about who is more likely to whistleblow:
women (Keil et al., 2010; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005) or men (Bashir et al., 2011; Miceli & Near, 1988; Sims & Keenan, 1999) . The results in the present study may be understood by women's relative lack of power in the Korean workplace where they feel more vulnerable in terms of employment security and are more likely to want to avoid controversy and unnecessary attention. The other main group with low WBI were those with between six and 20 years of service. Strong public sector job security and a desire among public employees to maintain this appears to hinder whistleblowing activities in Korea, particularly for employees who may feel locked in to a particular career path and still have a considerable number of years before retirement.
Political appointees, special service, and skilled and technical service employees all reported higher levels of WBI than those in regular government service. In the case of political appointees, this may be influenced by their relatively powerful positions within the government hierarchy, where their skills are in demand. However, all of these employee types are more likely to work alone or in small teams, meaning that they may be less concerned about potentially negative responses from colleagues.
The lack of longitudinal data and studies with similar questions on whistleblowing in Korea means that it is difficult to make comparisons. However, a greater proportion of respondents both indicated their intention to whistleblow and saw whistleblowing outside the organization as desirable than in Lee's (1999) study of Seoul City government. Although caution is needed in the absence of a directly comparable study, the findings do support research which has found attitude and knowledge of whistleblowing processes to have positive effects on WBI (Cho & Song, 2015; Near & Miceli, 1985; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009 ). Rather than seeing whistleblowing as having negative effects (Cruise, 2002) , public officials have shown their intention to come forward, but organizational and colleague support is clearly influential. This highlights the continued importance of collectivism, through loyalty and seeking a harmonious working climate. More practically, it points to the limits of legislation and toward the need for initiatives which can help create a supportive organizational culture.
It is important to note that the present study has some limitations. First, due to using data collected for government purposes, we were unable to include a wider range of variables relating to WBI. For example, questions about the perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing, types of wrongdoing, and status of wrongdoers may have helped to paint a more nuanced picture, as would distinguishing between awareness of protection and awareness of colleagues who actually received protection. In addition, as responses are based upon employee perceptions, they do not offer objective indicators of support, protection, and knowledge. Still, the data does offer a valuable insight into employee perceptions, and there are significant correlations with WBI.
As the Audit and Inspection Research Institute did not target particular characteristics among public officials, it could be suggested that those who associate greater risks with whistleblowing were less likely to respond. A recommendation for future research is to target particular respondent characteristics, for example through stratified sampling. More generally, future studies could conduct qualitative interviews with whistleblowers in order to investigate actual whistleblowing, rather than intent.
Implications and Recommendations
On the one hand, the results suggest that the Anti-Corruption Act and ACRC policy implementation have been somewhat effective in publicizing the importance of whistleblowing and raising knowledge of the available mechanisms. On the other hand, researchers have criticized ACRC's limited independence and investigative power, the narrow range of protections offered, poor enforcement of ACRC decisions, and the limited number of formal whistleblowing channels (Lee, J.Y., 2003; Park, 2008) . This was confirmed in the data as the majority of responses for protection against retaliation were in the lower half of the scale. This can be understood in the context of insufficient protection stemming from unclear rules in external, internal and anonymous reporting (Wolfe et al., 2014 (Choi & Park, 2014; Cooke & Brown, 2015) .
However, there is more that the Korean government can do to create a supportive environment in which employees feel comfortable blowing the whistle. As such, this study recommends that the Korean government should focus its efforts on training and promotional materials, which use empathy toolkits and outline the importance of supporting colleagues who report corruption. These efforts would need to be informed by awareness of the role of gender, tenure length, and position type in relation to WBI, in order to help shape an environment where all employees benefit from colleague and organizational support and do not feel that their employment would be jeopardized by whistleblowing. Engaging more employees in this way would help to improve WBI, and also have the broader positive effects of increasing transparency, fairness, and ultimately, increasing trust (Shim & Park, 2016) ; goals which are shared by whistleblowers. 
